Pakistan-Iran relationship
'Brothers' in Arms
by Sudha Ramachandran
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC18Df06.html
Pakistan has admitted that the former head of its nuclear weapons program Abdul Qadeer Khan gave Iran centrifuges for enriching uranium. While this is merely confirmation of what the world already knows, it is the first time that Pakistani officials have publicized details of what nuclear materials the scientist passed on to Iran.
But as in the past, the government continues to distance itself from the sale of nuclear technology to Iran and other countries. While admitting Khan's sale of centrifuges to Iran, Pakistan's Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said, "He helped Iran in his personal capacity, and the Pakistan government had nothing to do with it."
Few, however, would accept the veracity of the Pakistan government's claims that it was not aware of/not involved in/did not authorize the sale of nuclear technology. It would have been impossible for Khan to conceal his actions from the government.
Gaurav Kampani, senior research associate at Monterey Institute of International Studies' proliferation research and assessment program, points out Khan "could not have engaged in nuclear transfers for nearly two decades without sanction or tacit acknowledgement from sections or individuals within the Pakistani government".
The military's "tight control over the nuclear weapons program, multiple layers of security surrounding it, the exports of machinery and hardware from Pakistan, as well as rumors, leaks and past warnings about Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with Iran and North Korea by Western intelligence agencies" makes it hard to accept that the military was not aware of the transfer of nuclear technology.
On the face of it, the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is not surprising. After all, Pakistan had the nuclear technology and was willing to put it on sale. And Iran had the money to pay for the technology. Both countries have often drawn attention to their "long-standing brotherly relations". Islamabad has often described Iran as a "brother Islamic country" with whom it has "close friendly ties".
Indeed, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed a close relationship up to the late 1970s. They were on the same side during the Cold War. Both were close and crucial allies of the US, part of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Things soured, however, with the Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979.
A close examination of Iran-Pakistan relations reveals differences and many difficulties. Both might be Islamic nations, but Pakistan is Sunni-dominated, while Iran is overwhelmingly Shi'ite. This difference would assume critical importance in their bilateral relations with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Relations between the Pakistan's military dictator General Zia ul-Haq and Iran's new rulers were poor right from the start. Iran's rulers viewed Zia with deep suspicion. How could they forget the fact that the general had traveled to Iran in 1977-78 to shore up the Shah's regime.
What contributed further to the deterioration in Pakistan-Iran relations was Zia's Islamization initiative that was set in motion in 1979. This drive claimed to have a universal Islamic vision. In reality it was based on a narrow Sunni interpretation of Islamic theology and law. It was therefore unacceptable to Iran's Shi'ite clerics. As Zia's government pressed ahead with its sectarian agenda – it took a series of measures that gave a fillip to Sunni extremism, even encouraging the setting up of Sunni militant organizations –the Iranian government pushed ahead with exporting Shi'ite extremism, encouraging and arming Shi'ite extremism to counter Sunni militancy in Pakistan.
In the process, Pakistan became an important battleground between Sunni and Shi'ite forces in the region. This had serious impact on Iran-Pakistan relations. The impact of this backing of Shi'ite and Sunni extremism by the Iranian and Pakistani governments is felt to date in the region.
This mutual suspicion would deepen as the crisis in Afghanistan erupted and worsened. Zia's cozying up with the Americans and the way he welcomed the American military presence into Pakistan/Afghanistan and therefore the region was deeply resented by Iran's anti-American rulers. While Iran was uneasy with the proximity of the Americans to its borders, it was just as unhappy with the irreligious Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan.
Iran armed and funded Shi'ite resistance groups throughout the 1980s and maintained links with them after the Soviet withdrawal in late 1989. The rise of the Sunni Taliban in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan triggered great alarm in Iran and Pakistan's role in this development naturally plunged Iran-Pakistan relations further. It simultaneously led to a new warming in India-Iran relations, contributing to heightened suspicion in Pakistan of Teheran's intentions towards Islamabad.
With Iran and India backing the Northern Alliance and coordinating its anti-Taliban strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan's wariness of Iran deepened. In August 1998, Iran was enraged with Pakistan for not preventing the killing of several of its diplomats who were captured by the Taliban in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. It did seem for a while that Iran would even militarily retaliate for the death of its diplomats and that Pakistan would not escape Tehran's wrath.
Post-Taliban, Iran-Pakistan ties seem to have improved. Iran's concerns with regard to Pakistan's backing of the Taliban seem to have been allayed somewhat with the Pakistani government reversing its earlier policy of support to the Taliban. Tehran and Islamabad have taken big strides with regard to a proposed pipeline from Iran's oilfields through Pakistan to India and the two have recently agreed to conduct joint naval exercises.
These, however, seem to be incidents of tactical cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Mutual suspicion persists. Tehran blames Pakistan for the American presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It suspects Pakistan of cooperating with the US against Iran.
Pakistan suspects an Iranian hand in the turmoil in Balochistan. It believes that Iran is wary of the emergence of Gwadar port as a serious competitor to the strategic significance to the Iranian port city of Chabahar. And it is wary of Iran's warming ties with its number one enemy, India.
For all their claims of "brotherly ties", therefore, Iran and Pakistan have been deeply suspicious of each other for decades. It is therefore difficult to understand the nuclear cooperation between these two bitter rivals. It does seem that while they were on the one hand busy arming rival militias, they were also holding hands - albeit clandestinely - on the nuclear issue.
Pakistan and the US courtship alarmed Iran. But that did not prevent Tehran and Islamabad from exploring forbidden interaction with regard to transfer on nuclear technology.
Sources in India's Ministry of External Affairs point out that while the Pakistan-Iran clandestine dealings stretch over two decades, the height of the engagement on the nuclear issue took place between 1989 and 1995. With the Soviets leaving Afghanistan in 1989, Washington's use for Pakistan waned and the ardor of Pakistan's ties with the US had declined. While the Taliban emerged in 1994, its true face and the extent of the threat it posed to the region became apparent only by 1995-96.
Despite their intense bilateral differences from 1979 onwards, Pakistan and Iran were more than willing to engage on nuclear issues in the relatively tension-free 1989-95 period. Both stood to gain from the deals. Pakistan's military made much money from the transfer of technology. It also quietly got back at the US for having used it in Afghanistan and then neglected it thereafter. Iran's rulers gained access to technology for which they were desperate.
The Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation saga underscores that countries have neither permanent friends nor enemies; only permanent interests. In the murky world of nuclear proliferation, it does not matter who you purchase from or who you sell your technology to.
Despite their deep differences, the individual interests of Iran and Pakistan saw them come together on the question of nuclear technology. Pakistan was willing to sell nuclear technology to Iran, a country whose intentions it did not trust. And Iran purchased the technology from someone it did not really regard as a friend.
[Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.]
[Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.]
by Sudha Ramachandran
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC18Df06.html
Pakistan has admitted that the former head of its nuclear weapons program Abdul Qadeer Khan gave Iran centrifuges for enriching uranium. While this is merely confirmation of what the world already knows, it is the first time that Pakistani officials have publicized details of what nuclear materials the scientist passed on to Iran.
But as in the past, the government continues to distance itself from the sale of nuclear technology to Iran and other countries. While admitting Khan's sale of centrifuges to Iran, Pakistan's Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said, "He helped Iran in his personal capacity, and the Pakistan government had nothing to do with it."
Few, however, would accept the veracity of the Pakistan government's claims that it was not aware of/not involved in/did not authorize the sale of nuclear technology. It would have been impossible for Khan to conceal his actions from the government.
Gaurav Kampani, senior research associate at Monterey Institute of International Studies' proliferation research and assessment program, points out Khan "could not have engaged in nuclear transfers for nearly two decades without sanction or tacit acknowledgement from sections or individuals within the Pakistani government".
The military's "tight control over the nuclear weapons program, multiple layers of security surrounding it, the exports of machinery and hardware from Pakistan, as well as rumors, leaks and past warnings about Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with Iran and North Korea by Western intelligence agencies" makes it hard to accept that the military was not aware of the transfer of nuclear technology.
On the face of it, the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is not surprising. After all, Pakistan had the nuclear technology and was willing to put it on sale. And Iran had the money to pay for the technology. Both countries have often drawn attention to their "long-standing brotherly relations". Islamabad has often described Iran as a "brother Islamic country" with whom it has "close friendly ties".
Indeed, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed a close relationship up to the late 1970s. They were on the same side during the Cold War. Both were close and crucial allies of the US, part of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Things soured, however, with the Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979.
A close examination of Iran-Pakistan relations reveals differences and many difficulties. Both might be Islamic nations, but Pakistan is Sunni-dominated, while Iran is overwhelmingly Shi'ite. This difference would assume critical importance in their bilateral relations with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Relations between the Pakistan's military dictator General Zia ul-Haq and Iran's new rulers were poor right from the start. Iran's rulers viewed Zia with deep suspicion. How could they forget the fact that the general had traveled to Iran in 1977-78 to shore up the Shah's regime.
What contributed further to the deterioration in Pakistan-Iran relations was Zia's Islamization initiative that was set in motion in 1979. This drive claimed to have a universal Islamic vision. In reality it was based on a narrow Sunni interpretation of Islamic theology and law. It was therefore unacceptable to Iran's Shi'ite clerics. As Zia's government pressed ahead with its sectarian agenda – it took a series of measures that gave a fillip to Sunni extremism, even encouraging the setting up of Sunni militant organizations –the Iranian government pushed ahead with exporting Shi'ite extremism, encouraging and arming Shi'ite extremism to counter Sunni militancy in Pakistan.
In the process, Pakistan became an important battleground between Sunni and Shi'ite forces in the region. This had serious impact on Iran-Pakistan relations. The impact of this backing of Shi'ite and Sunni extremism by the Iranian and Pakistani governments is felt to date in the region.
This mutual suspicion would deepen as the crisis in Afghanistan erupted and worsened. Zia's cozying up with the Americans and the way he welcomed the American military presence into Pakistan/Afghanistan and therefore the region was deeply resented by Iran's anti-American rulers. While Iran was uneasy with the proximity of the Americans to its borders, it was just as unhappy with the irreligious Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan.
Iran armed and funded Shi'ite resistance groups throughout the 1980s and maintained links with them after the Soviet withdrawal in late 1989. The rise of the Sunni Taliban in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan triggered great alarm in Iran and Pakistan's role in this development naturally plunged Iran-Pakistan relations further. It simultaneously led to a new warming in India-Iran relations, contributing to heightened suspicion in Pakistan of Teheran's intentions towards Islamabad.
With Iran and India backing the Northern Alliance and coordinating its anti-Taliban strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan's wariness of Iran deepened. In August 1998, Iran was enraged with Pakistan for not preventing the killing of several of its diplomats who were captured by the Taliban in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. It did seem for a while that Iran would even militarily retaliate for the death of its diplomats and that Pakistan would not escape Tehran's wrath.
Post-Taliban, Iran-Pakistan ties seem to have improved. Iran's concerns with regard to Pakistan's backing of the Taliban seem to have been allayed somewhat with the Pakistani government reversing its earlier policy of support to the Taliban. Tehran and Islamabad have taken big strides with regard to a proposed pipeline from Iran's oilfields through Pakistan to India and the two have recently agreed to conduct joint naval exercises.
These, however, seem to be incidents of tactical cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Mutual suspicion persists. Tehran blames Pakistan for the American presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It suspects Pakistan of cooperating with the US against Iran.
Pakistan suspects an Iranian hand in the turmoil in Balochistan. It believes that Iran is wary of the emergence of Gwadar port as a serious competitor to the strategic significance to the Iranian port city of Chabahar. And it is wary of Iran's warming ties with its number one enemy, India.
For all their claims of "brotherly ties", therefore, Iran and Pakistan have been deeply suspicious of each other for decades. It is therefore difficult to understand the nuclear cooperation between these two bitter rivals. It does seem that while they were on the one hand busy arming rival militias, they were also holding hands - albeit clandestinely - on the nuclear issue.
Pakistan and the US courtship alarmed Iran. But that did not prevent Tehran and Islamabad from exploring forbidden interaction with regard to transfer on nuclear technology.
Sources in India's Ministry of External Affairs point out that while the Pakistan-Iran clandestine dealings stretch over two decades, the height of the engagement on the nuclear issue took place between 1989 and 1995. With the Soviets leaving Afghanistan in 1989, Washington's use for Pakistan waned and the ardor of Pakistan's ties with the US had declined. While the Taliban emerged in 1994, its true face and the extent of the threat it posed to the region became apparent only by 1995-96.
Despite their intense bilateral differences from 1979 onwards, Pakistan and Iran were more than willing to engage on nuclear issues in the relatively tension-free 1989-95 period. Both stood to gain from the deals. Pakistan's military made much money from the transfer of technology. It also quietly got back at the US for having used it in Afghanistan and then neglected it thereafter. Iran's rulers gained access to technology for which they were desperate.
The Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation saga underscores that countries have neither permanent friends nor enemies; only permanent interests. In the murky world of nuclear proliferation, it does not matter who you purchase from or who you sell your technology to.
Despite their deep differences, the individual interests of Iran and Pakistan saw them come together on the question of nuclear technology. Pakistan was willing to sell nuclear technology to Iran, a country whose intentions it did not trust. And Iran purchased the technology from someone it did not really regard as a friend.
[Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.]
[Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.]
posted by Roguentin at 8:13 PM
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