Saturday, May 14, 2005

Lebanon Politics

Michel Aoun comes home to roost

by Sami Moubayed [from Asia Times May 13, 2005]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GE13Ak02.html


DAMASCUS - Michel Aoun's return to Lebanon on May 7, after 15 years of exile, is yet to shake the political landscape of Lebanon. To some, it is a great victory, to others, a humiliation and a bitter reminder of civil war memories that many people have been working hard to forget.

Aoun returned to Lebanon on the offensive, hateful of everyone and everything that kept him in exile for so long, promising destruction of the existing order and sweet revenge. The Beirut he entered last week was very different from the war torn one he left behind in 1990. That Beirut did not have a Rafik Harrri hallmark on it. Yet, all the actors of Beirut 1990 are still there.

Former president Amin Gemayel, who appointed Aoun prime minister in 1988, upsetting tradition in Lebanon because Aoun was a Maronite, is still there. Patriarch Man Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, who worked for Aoun's downfall, is also still in religious office. Ex-prime minister Salim al-Hoss, who led a rivaling cabinet in 1989-1990, is there, and so is Samir Gagegea, who Aoun had viciously fought in the eastern districts of Beirut. The general who had been chief-of-staff and who had orchestrated Aoun's exodus from Baabda Palace, stands today in Baabda Palace, the legitimate and internationally recognized president of the Lebanese Republic.

At Beirut Airport, Aoun told the masses, most of whom were too young to remember the civil war, Lebanon will never be governed again by the "political feudalism" and "religious system that dates back to the 19th century". He called for an end to "old fashioned prototypes which represent the old bourgeoisie which persisted without questioning". Aoun has effectively promised to strike back at the entire political establishment of Lebanon. Will he succeed?

Before returning to Lebanon, Aoun promised a "tsunami" in Lebanese politics. Aoun's first encounter with the press and well-wishers at Beirut Airport was less than diplomatic. Annoyed at all the commotion, the ex-general barked at those welcoming him, claiming they were noisy. Once a military man, always a military man. Aoun was never a politician and never had direct contact with the Lebanese public. When people started seeing him as a national leader in 1989-1990, he was too busy with his war against Gagegea and Syria to engage in populist politics. The security situation in Lebanon also prevented him from doing that. He never staged rallies during his career in Lebanon, but rather, was always confined to the barracks, living the life of a professional soldier.

The average age of his supporters is 20, an age where young men and women are full of life, and easily enchanted by Aoun's fiery speeches, which he gave from his exile in France. A generation hungry for reform and hope, they supported Aoun as an exiled leader. Now that he has returned to Lebanon, and engaged himself once again in the dirty game of Arab politics, he might lose the aura he had created for himself as a "struggler" from 1990-2005. He also faces the difficulties of a wide generation gap between him and his supporters. Aoun is 70, while his supporters are in their early 20s. If he fails to live up to their expectations, this impatient generation could quickly abandon him and turn to younger, more attractive politicians.

Aoun has said he has his eyes set on the presidency, but by the next time presidential elections take place in Lebanon in 2007, Aoun will be 72. Also, Aoun needs to understand that unlike in the 1980s, the Maronites are no longer the de facto rulers of Lebanon - not because of Syria, but because demographics have changed in the Lebanese Republic. It is the Muslims (or more specifically the Shi'ites) who are the current majority in Lebanon, and any future deal should be cut with the Muslims. Aoun cannot spearhead opposition to traditional Muslim leaders, nor can he completely cozy up to them, in fear of losing support within his own Maronite constituency. While he was in exile, the Maronites created new leaders for themselves who even today would defeat Aoun in the most democratic of elections. The first name that comes to mind is Nasib Lahhoud, a moderate, seasoned, and highly respected Maronite politician. Also, so long as Aoun remains on bad terms with Sfeir, whom he promised to visit soon, he stands a slim chance of becoming the leader he strives to be, since Sfeir is still considered a principal figure and ultimate authority in Christian politics in Lebanon.


History of Michel Aoun

Aoun was born in 1935 into a poor family in Haret Hraik, a Shi'ite neighborhood that currently serves as a stronghold for Hezbollah, the Shi'ite resistance of Lebanon. It acquired this status in the 15-years of Aoun's absence in Paris, and upon his return to Beirut, one of the first questions fired at him by a journalist was whether he intended to visit his native neighborhood, which is swarming with Shi'ite warriors today, and meet with Hezbollah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah. He replied affirmatively.

The Haret Hraik that Aoun was born into in 1935 was a mixed Muslim-Christian suburb south of Beirut. Aoun attended Catholic schools, lived with a religious family, but declared years later that he "never differentiated between Ali and Peter, or between Hasan and Michel".

Aoun finished high school in 1955, during the heyday of Christian power in Lebanon under the regime of the Christian "king", president Kamil Sham'un. He enrolled at the Military Academy and graduated in 1958, while a Muslim uprising was raging in Lebanon against Sham'un. Aoun watched attentively as the Lebanese army, which he was entering, remained loyal to its president. When Aoun was 40, his country went to civil war, as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) of Yasser Arafat fought with the Muslims of Lebanon against the Maronite forces of Pierre Gemayel, who were backed by Syria. By the late 1970s, the Lebanese army had fractured along sectarian lines, yet Aoun, having learned from the 1958 experience, remained loyal to the central government. In the early 1980s, he became head of the "defense brigade" of the Lebanese army, a unit separating East and West Beirut. In 1982, he was involved in fighting against the Israeli army that occupied Beirut.

That same year, Aoun created the 8th brigade, which fought the Syrian army in the Souk al-Gharb pass overlooking Beirut. In June 1984, a reconciliation conference was held for all warring parties in Switzerland (brokered by former prime minister Rafiq al-Harriri). Army commander Ibrahim Tannous was fired and replaced by General Aoun. Aoun complied, but took no part in politics, giving no press interviews in 1984-1988. In September 1988, 15 minutes before the end of his term, president Amin Gemayel appointed Aoun prime minister, thereby breaching the National Pact of 1943, which said that a prime minister had to be a Muslim Sunni, whereas the president's office would be occupied exclusively by a Maronite Christian. Lebanon's Muslim prime minister, Salim al-Hoss, who had taken over after the assassination of prime minister Rashid Karameh, refused to step down, resulting in two Lebanese governments. Aoun's team reigned from Baabda Palace.

When he came to power, Aoun only controlled limited areas of East Beirut. To establish himself as a cross-confessional leader, Aoun began his war on the Lebanese Forces (LF), a Maronite militia headed by Gagegea. He ordered 15,000 of his troops into action and wrestled the port of Beirut from the LF. He shelled entire neighborhoods of East Beirut and infuriated the Christians of Lebanon, who to date, had kept East Beirut quiet and safe. Ghassan Tweini, publisher of the Beirut daily al-Nahhar, said in an interview years later that the Christians will not forgive Aoun for dropping bombs on their heads during what was labeled "the war of cancellation" within the Maronite community. On March 14, 1989, Aoun declared a "war of liberation" against Syria. This war was one of his bloodiest. He ignored the advice of the Arab League, destroyed what remained of West Beirut, and contributed to the exodus of over 1 million people from Beirut. He opened channels with Syria's archenemies, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and PLO chairman Arafat, both of whom supported him with no hesitation.

Aoun finally agreed to a cease-fire by the Arab League in September 1989, but refused to endorse the Taif Accord of Saudi Arabia (October 1989), claiming that it did not call for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon. He was also opposed to the constitutional changes that emerged at Taif, which stated that the Muslim prime minister would be voted on by parliament and not appointed by the Maronite president. Support for Taif came from both Gagegea and Sfeir, who declared that Aoun's stance was illegal and unconstitutional. Around 100 of Aoun's supporters even invaded the Patriarchal See in Bkirki, physically assaulting Sfeir for his support of Taif. Sfeir complained that Aoun's army, stationed at the gates of Bkirki, had failed to protect him. Aoun's "rebellion" ended rapidly when in August 1990, his friend Saddam invaded Kuwait. The United States, eager to defeat the Iraqi dictator, wanted Arab support in Operation Desert Storm. It found no better way to achieve that than through an alliance with Syria for the liberation of Kuwait. Syria's late president Hafez al-Asad sent his army to the Arabian Desert, and in reward, the US gave him a green light to bring the saga of Michel Aoun to an end.

On the morning of October 13, 1990, the Syrian army launched a massive operation on Baabda Palace and areas of East Beirut controlled by General Aoun. The defeated general fled to the French Embassy in Beirut then moved to Paris when president Francois Mitterrand gave him political asylum. Syria established itself in Lebanon with firm power through Lebanon's new president Elias Hrawi, his prime minister Rafiq al-Harriri, and speaker Nabih Berri, all of whom came to power with the direct backing of Damascus. Meanwhile, a pro-Aoun movement emerged in Beirut, among high school and university students, called the Free Patriotic Movement, which he supported from his Paris-exile. In 2003, Aoun played a leading role in getting the US to pass the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act, which brought criminal charges against him in Beirut, where many described his alliance with Washington against Damascus as treason. During the early 1990s, it became common in certain Christian neighborhoods to read the phrase: "Aoun will return!"


Aoun has returned

Aoun has returned and finds a political arena fertile for activism. The first issue to erupt in everyone's face is the 2000 election law, which will govern parliamentary elections scheduled to take place for Lebanon's 128-seat chamber on four consecutive Sundays, starting on May 29. This law, drafted by General Ghazi Kenaan, who was Syria's intelligence supreme in Lebanon until 2002, places Christian districts within larger Muslim ones. Bsherri, for example, the birthplace of Gagegea and a strong base for his disbanded LF, is in the same district as Dinniyeh, which has a Muslim majority. With a Muslim majority, the Christians will have to rely on them for the victory of their candidates. Chairman of the Lebanese Socialist Progressive party and opposition leader Walid Jumblatt has allied himself with Sfeir, much to the displeasure of Aoun, and Saad al-Harriri, the political heir and son of Lebanon's slain former prime minister Rafiq al-Harriri. A meeting on Tuesday between Harriri Jr and Aoun raises fears of a Aoun-Harriri alliance in the upcoming elections, much to the displeasure of Jumblatt, who refuses to meet or work with Aoun. Christian opposition members are pressing for a new law with smaller constituencies but many are opposed to any change, fearing that a change would delay the elections, which Prime Minister Najib Mikati has promised to hold on time.

For his part, Aoun is delicately striking his election alliances with former archenemies and foes. Aoun received Strida Gagegea, the wife of arrested warlord Samir Gagegea, and promised to "turn a page on the past". Samir Gagegea, arrested in 1994, will be released from jail soon, but not before the elections take place, since it is in nobody's interest in Lebanon for him to enter the election race, after 11 years of arrest, and turn the tables on Aoun, Lahhoud, Jumblatt and practically everyone else.

More surprisingly, Aoun received Hezbollah representative Ali Ammar, who said that a high-profile meeting was soon to be held between Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah, since both men share a parallel vision on political reform. Both imposed themselves on Lebanese politics forcefully, and neither are members of the feudal notability of Lebanese politics that has been in power with no interruptions since the turn of the 20th century. Many fear an electoral alliance between Nasrallah and Aoun, which Ammar hinted at after his meeting with the ex-general. Aoun has also received another traditional foe, the Amal Movement, which is headed by the pro-Syrian Speaker of Parliament Berri.

Aoun has also allied himself with the pro-Syrian ex-minister of interior Sulayman Franjiyyieh, who visited him upon his return to Beirut and said that Aoun's team were "true Christians", claiming that rivalries in the past do not mean an alliance cannot be formed between them today. Aoun also allied himself with Emile Lahhoud Jr, the son of the president who is a deputy in parliament for the Maronite stronghold of al-Metn. An alliance with Lahhoud Jr would also mean an alliance with Lahhoud Jr's brother-in-law Elias al-Murr, another pro-Syrian former minister of interior. Traditionally, the Lahhouds and their in-laws, the Murrs, were the ones to gain the most from the 2000 election law, because due to their alliance with pro-Syrian Muslims, they also secured a majority in parliamentary elections. Today, both the Lahhouds and Murrs fear that Aoun's popularity in al-Metn would ruin their standing among Christian voters in the Maronite district. That is why the president said on Tuesday that the 2000 election law, which he had once relentlessly defended, "does not achieve equality among the Lebanese". If Aoun allies himself with other politicians in al-Metn, like ex-president Gemayel or Nasib Lahhoud, he can easily defeat the Lahhouds and the Murrs. This is why Lahhoud Jr, probably under the guidance of his father, hurried to work with Aoun, although Aoun has been the loudest critic of the Lahhoud regime since its creation in 1998, describing it as a Syrian-creation.

A defeat for Lahhoud in the upcoming elections would be a disaster for the Lebanese president, for he would run a high risk of being voted out of office if an anti-Syrian, or anti-Lahhoud parliament is elected. That is why the Lahhouds, who have been pro-Syria more than Syria itself, need Aoun today (more so than Syria) to survive in Lebanon. Another early-caller on Aoun was Druze leader Talal Arslan, who combats Jumblatt over leadership of the Druze community in Lebanon. He too offered to work with Aoun, to defeat Jumblatt in the Druze-Maronite district of Aley.

Jumblatt would also fear an alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah in Baabda. Jumblatt, fearing Aoun's influence in the elections, was highly critical of Aoun and called on Lahhoud to resign, wanting to get rid of both men. Aoun stood up for the Lebanese president, who he has repeatedly criticized, signaling that he might ally himself with Lahhoud, Syria, and Hezbollah, to defeat Jumblatt and the current leaders of the Lebanese opposition. Once rid of Jumblatt, and in the power struggle of Lebanon, he would turn his attention against Lahhoud, Syria, and Hezbollah. This is a complex and complicated game, even by the standards of Lebanon.

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Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

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